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A B S T R A C T
Following the March 2011 nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima, Japan, nuclear power production de-
clined sharply in that country as well as Germany. Despite widespread media coverage of CO2 emission increases
in the first few years afterward, subsequent energy and emission changes and their implications are not well-
studied. Here we analyze energy, electricity, and CO2 emissions data for both countries through 2017. We also
quantify the human health and CO2 implications of two simple yet illuminating scenarios: What if both countries
had reduced fossil fuel power output instead of nuclear? And what if the US and the rest of Europe eliminate
their remaining nuclear power? We find that emissions increased after Fukushima until 2013 but decreased
thereafter due to record-high renewable energy production and lower total energy use. However our “what if”
scenarios demonstrate that these two countries could have prevented 28,000 air pollution-induced deaths and
2400 MtCO2 emissions between 2011 and 2017. Germany can still prevent 16,000 deaths and 1100 MtCO2
emissions by 2035 by reducing coal instead of eliminating nuclear as planned. If the US and the rest of Europe
follow Germany's example they could lose the chance to prevent over 200,000 deaths and 14,000 MtCO2
emissions by 2035.
1. Introduction
The Fukushima Daiichi accident (hereafter, simply “Fukushima” or
“the accident”) and its consequences have been scientifically assessed in
several comprehensive UN studies (UNSCEAR, 2013; IAEA, 2015;
UNSCEAR, 2016) and the numerous peer-reviewed papers discussed
therein. These studies describe numerous direct and indirect radi-
ological and socioeconomic impacts such as farmland and fishery
contamination by radionuclides and long-term displacement of tens of
thousands of nearby residents. However they reach the same general
conclusion that widespread ecological or human health effects were not
expected in the near or long term, with the notable exception of mental
health impacts associated with the mass evacuations, loss of liveli-
hoods, and fear of radiation fallout (and of nuclear power in general).
Nevertheless, immediately following the accident the government of
Japan greatly curtailed national nuclear power production, which was
previously the third highest level in the world but is now the 14th
highest of the 30 nuclear energy producing countries (BP, 2018; IEA,
2018a). A major reason for this reduction was implementation of en-
hanced safety protocols (Normile, 2018). As a result the future of nu-
clear power in Japan remains uncertain, though the government has
adopted plans to restore the share of electricity from nuclear to over
20% by 2030, in part to enhance energy independence, which was
significantly diminished after Fukushima (Government of Japan, 2018).
The accident also spurred Germany to adopt a goal of eliminating all
domestic nuclear power production by 2022 (IEA, 2011; Arlt and
Wolling, 2016). As of now these plans are still in place (IAEA, 2018a),
though it remains to be seen whether they can realistically be achieved.
Although this decision was consistent with longstanding and wide-
spread anti-nuclear sentiment among the German public and had broad
political and public support (Arlt and Wolling, 2016), it was none-
theless striking, given the lack of any serious nuclear accidents in
Germany and the low likelihood of reactor-affecting natural hazards
such as the earthquake and tsunami that caused Fukushima, as well as
the decades-long record of nuclear power in preventing large amounts
of greenhouse gas emissions and fatal particulate pollution that would
have resulted from fossil fuel use (Kharecha and Hansen, 2013;
Mielonen et al., 2015; Severnini, 2017).
In this study we analyze the nature and implications of post-
Fukushima energy and CO2 emission changes in both of these countries
using empirical data covering 2000–2017 (Boden et al., 2017; BP, 2018;
IEA, 2018a). Although emissions increases until 2013 garnered wide-
spread international media coverage (e.g. Iwata, 2014; The Japan
Times, 2014), we show that these increases were not persistent
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thereafter. This finding was somewhat surprising, given that nuclear
energy provided a substantial fraction of non-fossil energy in both
countries before the accident. We assess the reasons for this, while also
quantifying the avoidable impacts of rapidly phasing down nuclear
with regard to CO2 emissions and human health. We accomplish the
latter by analyzing a simple counterfactual scenario: What if Japan and
Germany had reduced electricity production from coal by similar
amounts as they reduced nuclear? The targeting of coal has strong basis
given that it is the single largest source of cumulative historical emis-
sions (Boden et al., 2017) and, like nuclear, it remains a key source of
baseload electricity for much of the world, including these two coun-
tries (BP, 2018; IEA, 2018a). Lastly, we also examine the implications of
a similar “what if” scenario for the world's top two nuclear energy
users, the US and the rest of Europe (excluding Former Soviet Union).
2. Methods
2.1. TPE, electricity, and CO2 emissions
For total primary energy use (TPE) and electricity generation we use
the latest BP (formerly British Petroleum) and International Energy
Agency (IEA) datasets (BP, 2018; IEA, 2018a). These datasets use two
different energy accounting methods to convert electricity data to
common energy units, which differ mainly in their assumptions re-
garding conversion efficiencies of individual power sources (for further
details see Annex II of IPCC, 2014). These different methods can lead to
discrepancies in TPE results for non-combustible energy sources in
particular. The BP method generally leads to relatively high TPE values
for several renewables including wind and solar. Nonetheless, the
overall differences for both TPE and electricity data are fairly small
(within a few %) for both the absolute data and the shares from each
energy source (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and Supplementary Materials).
As our primary study focus is the electricity sector, TPE data are shown
only in the Supplementary Materials (Figs. S1 and S2). Because the
annual data represent year-end values and the Fukushima accident
occurred in March 2011, we take 2011 as the first year of the post-
Fukushima period.
For annual TPE CO2 emissions from fossil fuel burning we rely on
archived data from US DOE-CDIAC (Boden et al., 2017), which end in
2014, and IEA (2018b), which end in 2016. Following previous
methods of ours (Hansen et al., 2017, and refs therein) as well as
CDIAC's, we extend these emissions data to 2017 by normalizing to BP
energy use data for years 2015–2017 as follows, for a given fuel i and
year t:
E(i, t)= E(i, t-1)×BP(i, t)/BP(i, t-1), (1)
where E(i, t)=CDIAC or IEA emissions and BP(i, t)= BP primary en-
ergy consumption data.
We separately calculate emissions from electricity generation based
on emission factors from Table 2.2 of Ch. 2 of the IPCC (2006) guide-
lines – specifically 97.5 tCO2/TJ for coal (average for the different
types, i.e. anthracite [98.3], bituminous [94.6–96.1], and lignite
[101]), 56.1 tCO2/TJ for gas, and 73.3 tCO2/TJ for oil. Because these
factors relate to the intrinsic energy content of each fuel, we convert
them to electricity-relevant values by dividing by an assumed thermal
plant efficiency of 0.38 (following the BP [2018] method for converting
electricity data into TPE data) then multiplying by 3600 J/Wh. This
yields ∼0.924 MtCO2/TWh for coal, 0.531 MtCO2/TWh for gas, and
0.694 MtCO2/TWh for oil. Note that these values reflect combustion-
stage emissions only (see Section 2.3). Carbon intensities (CI) are then
calculated simply by dividing the corresponding emissions values by
TPE, electricity, or GDP data (the latter are from World Bank, 2018). CI
of TPE and electricity are shown in Section 3 and CI of GDP is shown in
Fig. S3.
2.2. Avoidable impacts
In this study we define avoidable impacts as the CO2 emissions and
human health impacts that could have been avoided if instead of re-
ducing nuclear electricity production after Fukushima, both countries
had reduced their coal electricity production by equivalent amounts.
For simplicity and transparency we adopt the general calculation ap-
proach of Kharecha and Hansen, 2013 (hereafter “KH2013”), with
some modifications as described below. This method is justifiable in
light of a subsequent study along similar lines (Mielonen et al., 2015)
which used a sophisticated 3-D global aerosol-climate model and found
remarkably similar results for mortality (within uncertainties), albeit
with much higher mean annual values (which, as an aside, reinforces
the assertion in KH2013 that the values therein are likely conservative).
Note that we limit human health considerations in our study to pre-
mature mortality resulting from fatal air pollution due to fossil fuel use.
Other significant health effects would of course also be expected – e.g.
for fossil fuel power sources, serious illnesses tend to be about 10 times
higher than mortality (see KH2013 and refs therein).
Following Eq. (4) of KH2013, we calculate annual avoidable im-
pacts I(t) for years 2011–2017 as follows, for a given year t:
I(t)= [ E(n, 2010) - E(n, t) ]× [ IF(c) - IF(n) ], (2)
where I(t)=mortality or CO2 emission impacts, n= nuclear, c= coal,
E= electricity generation (from BP 2018), and IF= impact factor
(mortality or emissions per TWh). The emission impact factor for coal is
the one derived in Section 2.1. The mortality impact factor for nuclear
is taken directly from Table 1 of KH2013, which as described therein,
represents full life-cycle mortality from nuclear (including accident-
related deaths among the public and plant workers).
For coal-related mortality impact factors, rather than using the
value from KH2013 for IF(c) in Eq. (2), we derive modified values as
follows. We start with the country-specific estimates for total outdoor
air pollution deaths in 2010 from Table 2 of Lelieveld et al. (2015) and
multiply each of them by the corresponding proportions from electricity
generation in the same table. This yields total electricity sector-related
outdoor air pollution deaths in 2010, which amount to ∼4250 in
Japan, 4420 in Germany, and 17,050 in the US. Using year 2010 values
for fuel-specific pollutant emissions (SO2 and NOx) from Table 7 of
EIA's electricity data tables (EIA, 2018) we calculate that coal in the US
accounts for 86.2% of these emissions. We then apply this proportion to
the total electricity-related deaths listed above to derive the number of
deaths caused by coal electricity production in each country. We be-
lieve this is a reasonable approach given broadly similar air pollution
standards among developed countries and given the prime role of SO2
and NOx emissions as chemical precursors to fatal particulates (Caiazzo
et al., 2013; Dedoussi and Barrett, 2014; Thurston et al., 2016).
We then divide these coal-specific deaths by year 2010 coal elec-
tricity data for each country (averaged between the BP and IEA data-
sets). This yields mortality IF(c) values in Eq. (2) of 12 deaths/TWh for
Japan, 14 deaths/TWh for Germany, and 8 deaths/TWh for the US. By
comparison, KH2013 used a global value of ∼29 deaths/TWh for coal,
which as mentioned above yielded results broadly similar (though on
average much lower) to a more sophisticated study (Mielonen et al.,
2015) – thus, the mortality-related impacts we report here might like-
wise be quite conservative.
For Japan and Germany we use the above values for mortality im-
pact factors, but for the US we note that there have been several studies
besides Lelieveld et al. (2015) that quantify electricity-related air pol-
lution mortality in the US. Specifically, Caiazzo et al. (2013), Fann et al.
(2013), and Penn et al. (2017), which respectively estimate 52,000,
38,000, and 21,000 deaths from US electricity generation in 2005.
Using the same method as above yields mortality IF(c) values for the US
of 22, 16, and 9 deaths/TWh respectively based on these additional
studies. Thus in our calculations for potential future avoidable impacts
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for both the US as well as the rest of Europe we use the average of the
above four US values for mortality IF(c) in Eq. (2), i.e. 14 deaths/TWh.
This has the added benefit of greater consistency with the mortality IF
(c) values for Japan and Germany.
As with KH2013, note that IF(c) ≫ IF(n) in all cases, so I(t) in Eq. (2)
is positive when nuclear electricity production has decreased relative to
2010, i.e. the pre-Fukushima level. Thus, positive values of I(t) in Eq.
(2) represent avoidable deaths or emissions caused by post-Fukushima
reduction of nuclear instead of coal. The numbers presented in Section
3.3 reflect the net sum of I(t) values over the relevant time periods.
Note that Eq. (2) uses nuclear electricity production in 2010 as the
baseline. Results from alternative cases appear in the Supplementary
Materials. We examine such alternatives only for Germany because its
nuclear output exhibited a modestly declining trend for a few years
before Fukushima, unlike in Japan (see Section 3).
We additionally examine avoidable impacts of proceeding to com-
plete nuclear phaseout in Germany, the US, and the rest of Europe
(excluding Former Soviet Union, where there are no indications that
nuclear power will be reduced in the near future). Assuming an average
reactor lifetime of 50 years and based on the start dates of commercial
operation listed in Table 14 of IAEA (2018b), we assess that the current
reactor fleets in these regions could last well into the 2030s. Thus we
take the end year for our projection period to be 2035. For Germany we
first assume a linear phaseout of all remaining nuclear output between
2018 and 2022, then fix nuclear output at zero until 2035. This yields
values of E(n,t) for t from 2018 to 2035 in Eq. (2). Then, using 2017 as
the new base year instead of 2010, the annual electricity difference
term in Eq. (2) becomes E(n, 2017) - E(n, t), for t from 2018 to 2035.
For the US and the rest of Europe we assume a simple linear phaseout of
nuclear output over this same period (2018–2035). We take 2017 as the
base year for these regions as well, so the Eq. (2) electricity difference
term becomes E(n, 2017) - E(n, trend.2018–2035(t)), for t from 2018 to
2035. Results for these projection cases are reported in Section 3.3.
In addition to avoidable impacts resulting from our counterfactual
scenarios, for Japan we also compute the potential mortality and CO2
emission impacts caused by the actual post-Fukushima substitution of
nuclear by fossil fuels that is discussed in Section 3.1. For each year t
from 2011 to 2017 we now use the following equation instead of Eq.
(2):
I(t)= [ E(i, t) - E(i, 2010) ]× IF(i), (3)
where E(i, t) and IF(i) in this case denote electricity production and
impact factor values for i= coal or gas only. (As we infer in Section 3.1,
these two sources were the primary replacements for reduced nuclear in
Japan. Note however that oil-based electricity production also in-
creased after Fukushima, albeit temporarily, as shown in Section 3.1 –
thus our results based on Eq. (3) are likely underestimates.) Emission
factors for this case are the same as in Section 2.1. For mortality factors,
we use the above value for coal in Japan (12 deaths/TWh) and, using a
similar approach, we derive a factor for gas in Japan of 0.77 deaths/
TWh. Here, positive values of I(t) represent directly caused deaths/
emissions (as opposed to potentially avoidable ones), since fossil fuel
use has increased from the base year 2010. In this case there is only one
point at which I(t) is negative for either fuel – in 2011 coal electricity
production decreased by 31 TWh. For reference, the net sums of addi-
tional coal and gas electricity production from 2011 to 2017 are
155 TWh and 633 TWh respectively (additional relative to their 2010
values).
2.3. Uncertainties and limitations
For similar reasons as discussed in KH2013, the main uncertainties
in our analysis arise from our derived mortality impact factors. For
example, this study likewise assumes static (i.e. time-independent)
impact factors for Eqs. (2) and (3); in reality, these values are likely to
change because they depend on the energy mix and emissions regula-
tions of a given region. Specifically, mortality factors are likely to de-
crease with stricter controls on pollutant emissions from coal, which
would generally lead to overestimates of avoidable mortality. On the
other hand, new findings (Burnett et al., 2018) indicate that PM2.5-
related mortality could be substantially higher than previously esti-
mated, including by Lelieveld et al. (2015), whose results form the
primary basis for our mortality factors (as discussed in Section 2.2).
Given that these two sources of uncertainty essentially counteract each
other, we take our mortality factors to be reasonable estimates for the
time periods we analyze.
Nonetheless, in order to quantitatively include some uncertainty in
these factors, based on the air pollution studies cited above to derive
them (Caiazzo et al., 2013; Fann et al., 2013; Lelieveld et al., 2015;
Penn et al., 2017), we conservatively prescribe the lower and upper
bounds of uncertainty ranges (URs) in this study as 50% below and 30%
above the central values, respectively. Thus, our mortality impact fac-
tors plus URs would be 12 (6–15.6) deaths/TWh and 0.77 (0.39–1.0)
deaths/TWh for Japan's coal and gas, respectively, and 14 (7–18.2)
deaths/TWh for coal in Germany, the US, and the rest of Europe. Re-
sults in Section 3.3 incorporate these URs.
Another source of uncertainty in our study relates to the precise
causes of post-Fukushima energy system changes that we describe in
Section 3 for Japan and Germany – i.e., conclusive attribution of sub-
sequent changes to the accident itself (as opposed to other possible
factors). Although such a causation analysis could be interesting in its
own right, we do not include it because it would involve issues that are
outside the scope of this study, such as utility decision making, energy
economics, and distinction between residential and utility electricity
production. Moreover, our fundamental goal is to describe the energy
changes and assess their effects (implications) rather than their precise
causes. For example, quantification of the health and environmental
impacts that could have been avoided from post-Fukushima energy
choices (Section 3.3) is rooted in the most important change relevant to
our study: the sudden and large reduction of nuclear power output
despite continued (and in some cases increased) fossil fuel power
output. It is clear that this particular change is a direct consequence of
post-accident energy choices, as shown in Sections 3.1 and Section 3.2
and references therein.
Lastly, our mortality impact factor for nuclear is based on life-cycle
analysis that includes accident-related deaths among the public and
plant workers and is taken from KH2013. For fossil fuels though, our
impact factors are based only on the combustion stage, thus they do not
represent all potential damages. However for fossil fuels the vast ma-
jority of health-related impacts as well as emissions result from the
combustion stage (Markandya and Wilkinson, 2007; IPCC, 2014),
therefore this is not a significant limitation.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Japan
Electricity generation in Japan shows a modest long-term decline
(< 10% between 2000 and 2017; Fig. 1a), with a 2017 value that is 4%
of the world total. This overall decline continued after Fukushima, al-
though the proportion of electricity from fossil fuels increased from
64% in 2010 to 78% in 2017 (Fig. 1b). This increase appears to be a
direct result of the share of nuclear plummeting after the accident from
25% in 2010 to zero in 2014. However it has marginally increased since
then, reaching 3% at the end of 2017 (Fig. 1b). Furthermore, although
13 of Japan's reactors have been permanently shut down since the ac-
cident, 42 remain on standby (representing 85% of pre-Fukushima
nuclear capacity) and two reactors are under construction with 9 more
planned (IAEA, 2018b).
A detailed breakdown by individual electricity sources (Fig. 1a),
along with the fact that Japan has neither imported nor exported any
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electricity for decades (IEA, 2018a), shows that gas and coal have
evidently been the primary replacements for lost nuclear, with their
combined share of total electricity rising from 55% in 2010 to 73% in
2017. Electricity production from oil also increased for the first two
years after Fukushima but then declined thereafter. Renewable share
increased from 11% in 2010 to 19% in 2017 (Fig. 1b). This increase was
driven mainly by expanding solar energy, the share of which grew from
near-zero in 2010 to 6% in 2017 (Fig. 1a).
As shown in Fig. 2a, total CO2 emissions from TPE in Japan
amounted to 1144 MtCO2/yr in 2017 (5th highest in the world) and
have been more or less steady since 2000, with the dominant sources in
2017 being oil and coal (∼40% each) followed by gas (20%). After
Fukushima, emissions increased modestly until 2013 then slightly de-
creased between 2014 and 2017. This decrease was largely driven by a
decline in oil emissions between 2013 and 2017 from the electricity
sector (see next paragraph). Coal and gas emissions both increased very
slightly in 2017, returning total emissions to the pre-Fukushima (2010)
level. Carbon intensity of TPE exhibits sustained increases after Fu-
kushima and remains elevated relative to 2010 (inset in Fig. 2a). The
discrepancies between the IEA and BP inset curves arise due to the
energy accounting differences described in Section 2.1.
Unlike TPE emissions, total electricity-sector CO2 emissions in
Japan (which we compute ourselves; see Section 2.1) show a long-term
increase since 2000, reaching 570 MtCO2/yr in 2017 (Fig. 3a). After
Fukushima they follow a broadly similar pattern as TPE emissions but
with greater interannual changes and different dominant sources (i.e.
coal and gas as opposed to coal and oil in TPE). These emissions remain
higher than the pre-Fukushima level by ∼10% (Fig. 3a), and account
Fig. 1. Electricity generation by source (left) and total electricity generation and aggregate source fractions (right) for Japan (top) and Germany (bottom),
2000–2017. Data are from IEA (2018a) and BP (2018). Dashed vertical lines labeled “Fukushima” represent the timing of the accident. All annual values are taken to
be end-year values, hence we consider 2011 the first year after the accident. FF = fossil fuels, geo/bio = geothermal + bioenergy, renw = all renewables
(hydro + non-hydro). See Fig. S2 for cumulative post-Fukushima shares of electricity.
Fig. 2. Annual primary energy fossil fuel CO2 emissions for a) Japan and b) Germany, 2000–2017. Emission data are from US CDIAC archives (solid lines;
Boden et al., 2017) and IEA (dashed lines; IEA, 2018b) and have been extended to 2017. All FFs= all fossil fuels combined. Inset graphs show carbon intensity (CI) of
TPE, computed using CDIAC emission data and IEA and BP energy data.
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for a gradually increasing share of TPE emissions since 2000 (Fig. S4), a
trend which has accelerated after Fukushima. Carbon intensity of
electricity increased significantly from 2011 to 2013 then decreased
thereafter, though it remains higher than in 2010 (inset in Fig. 3a).
However it could return to lower levels if nuclear power production
resumes per the government's plans (Government of Japan, 2018). CI of
GDP (Fig. S3) has been steadily declining since 2000 (except for a post-
Fukushima increase from 2011 to 2013), reflecting decoupling of Ja-
pan's economic growth and CO2 emissions.
If the TPE emissions trend from 2013 to 2017 is extrapolated to
2030 (Fig. 4a), we find that Japan would achieve its stated Nationally
Determined Contribution (NDC) under the 2015 Paris Agreement,
which aims for 26% lower emissions in 2030 versus 2013 (UNFCCC,
2018). However this NDC is weaker than previous pledges due to post-
Fukushima energy changes (Kuramochi, 2015). Furthermore if emis-
sions are extrapolated from 2011 instead of 2013, Japan will overshoot
its NDC by 144 MtCO2/yr (+16%; Fig. 4a). Compensation of this
overshoot should be feasible though, e.g. via a combination of con-
tinued total electricity use reduction, reduced coal and gas emissions,
increased nuclear and renewable energy production, and other emis-
sions-cutting measures. However Japan's climate change and air pol-
lution mitigation goals will likely be seriously undermined by the
dozens of recently built or planned coal-fired power plants (Kuramochi,
2015; Normile, 2018). Moreover, by the UN's own assessments
(UNFCCC, 2016; UNEP, 2017) and other scientific analyses (Rogelj
et al., 2016), the aggregate effect of national NDCs would lead to global
temperatures well above 2 °C – a target which itself is highly dubious in
terms of “safety” (Knutti et al., 2015; Hansen et al., 2017).
3.2. Germany
Total electricity generation in Germany shows a clear long-term
increase in both the IEA and BP datasets (∼13% between 2000 and
2017; Fig. 1c and d), with a 2017 value that is 2.6% of the world total.
This increasing trend largely continued after Fukushima. The propor-
tion of electricity from fossil fuels decreased from 57% in 2010 to 51%
in 2017 (Fig. 1d), while the share of nuclear essentially halved. Unlike
with Japan, the latter was a result of rapid reduction of overall reactor
number and capacity, both of which fell by over 50% between 2010 and
2017 so that there now only 7 operational reactors left nationwide
(IAEA, 2018b).
As discussed in Section 2.3, although a detailed attribution analysis
of the causes of post-Fukushima electricity changes is outside the scope
of this study, at face value these changes reveal some interesting dy-
namics. Based on aggregated source data alone (Fig. 1d) it might appear
that Germany's post-Fukushima reduction of nuclear was replaced by
increased renewables. A closer examination of the individual sources
(Fig. 1c) suggests that, at least in the first year following the accident
(2011), this indeed seems to have happened, for three key reasons: 1)
non-hydro renewables (wind, solar, and bioenergy) increased in 2011
while all other significant sources (coal, gas, oil, nuclear, and hydro)
decreased; 2) total electricity production decreased by only half the
sum of the individual decreases; and 3) Germany was a net exporter of
electricity in 2011, as it has been every year since 2003 (and its exports
have continually increased since Fukushima; see Fig. S5). If this qua-
litative attribution analysis is correct for 2011, this apparent substitu-
tion is somewhat surprising, given the different nature of these energy
Fig. 3. Annual electricity sector fossil CO2 emissions for a) Japan and b) Germany, 2000–2017. Solid and dashed lines are based on BP (2018) and IEA (2018a)
electricity data, respectively. All values are original calculations except for the open square curves, which are directly from IEA (2018b) and end in 2015. All
FFs= all fossil fuels combined. Our results for total emissions agree well with the IEA data overall (within ∼10% for each year). Inset graphs show CI of electricity;
unlike in Fig. 2 the IEA/BP inset curves are not labeled separately here because they are almost identical (because the underlying electricity data are almost
identical).
Fig. 4. TPE CO2 emissions by source in a) Japan and b) Germany compared to each country's Paris Agreement Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs). For simplicity only the CDIAC data from Fig. 2 are included for the historical period (solid lines). Two sets of extrapolations are shown
(dashed lines): one based on the full post-Fukushima (2011–2017) emission trends and the other using 2013–2017 emission trends only. The latter represents a
stronger decreasing trend because post-Fukushima emissions peaked in 2013 in both countries.
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sources – i.e. nuclear, hydro, and fossil fuels provide continuous
(baseload) power whereas solar and wind provide variable power.
However as shown in Fig. 1c, in the subsequent two years (2012 and
2013) coal and hydro increased in addition to non-hydro renewables.
Then from 2014 to 2017, electricity production from coal resumed its
pre-Fukushima decline, dropping from 44% of total electricity in 2010
to 37% in 2017. Total renewables now account for a record one-third of
total national electricity production (Fig. 1d), almost entirely from non-
hydro sources, i.e. wind (16% of total), solar (6%), and biomass/geo-
thermal (8%). For the past three consecutive years though
(2015–2017), electricity from gas has risen substantially – it is now over
40% higher than in 2014 (Fig. 1c).
Fig. 2b shows that CO2 emissions from TPE in Germany were 715
MtCO2/yr in 2017 (6th highest in the world) and they exhibit a modest
long-term decline since 2000, with the individual sources in 2017
amounting to 39% (coal), 36% (oil), and 25% (gas). Emissions de-
creased in the first year after Fukushima (2011) then increased to 2013
and decreased overall thereafter, with the level in 2017 being slightly
lower than in 2010. However emissions from gas use have risen 22%
over three consecutive years (2015–2017), concomitant with the rise in
electricity from gas described above. If the latter trend continues it
could substantially hinder Germany's climate change mitigation efforts.
Total electricity-sector CO2 emissions in Germany reached 273
MtCO2/yr in 2017, slightly lower than the pre-Fukushima level
(Fig. 3b). Emissions from gas remain far lower than those from coal,
however their relative increase is even more significant than with TPE
(+41% between 2014 and 2017). Unlike with Japan, carbon intensities
of TPE and electricity changed relatively little after Fukushima (insets
in Figs. 2b and 3b). Electricity-sector emissions have accounted for a
near-steady share (∼40%) of overall emissions from 2000 onwards
(Fig. S4).
If Germany's TPE emissions trend from 2013 to 2017 is extrapolated
to 2030 (Fig. 4b), it would overshoot its NDC by 52 MtCO2/yr (+9%).
The NDC is based on the EU-wide goal, which aims for 40% lower
emissions in 2030 versus 1990 (UNFCCC, 2018). If emissions are ex-
trapolated from 2011 onward instead, the overshoot increases to 87
MtCO2/yr (+15%). As with Japan, compensation of either overshoot
should readily be feasible (adequacy of the NDCs notwithstanding), in
this case if Germany even partially refrains from phasing out all of its
remaining nuclear and instead curtails coal, which would also greatly
benefit human health (see next section).
3.3. Avoidable impacts: missed opportunities
Finally, we examine avoidable impacts arising from electricity
production changes after Fukushima by quantifying the mortality and
CO2 emissions that could have been prevented if these countries had
reduced coal instead of nuclear. For Japan we additionally quantify the
consequences of actually having replaced nuclear with fossil fuels (coal
and gas).
We find that Japan could have prevented up to 21,000 (UR:
10,500–27,300) premature air pollution-related deaths and 1700
MtCO2 cumulative emissions from coal burning between 2011 and
2017 (Fig. 5). Furthermore Japan's post-Fukushima energy choices
might have caused another 2300 (UR: 1150–2990) deaths and 480
MtCO2 cumulative emissions due to the cumulative addition of
789 TWh from coal and gas since the accident. These avoidable indirect
consequences of Fukushima have compounded the devastating loss of
life from the earthquake and tsunami that caused the accident in the
first place.
Likewise, Germany could have prevented up to 4600 (UR:
2300–5980) deaths and 300 MtCO2 cumulative emissions between
2011 and 2017. And if the country proceeds to total nuclear phaseout
by 2022, it could lose the chance to prevent an additional 16,000 (UR:
8000–21,000) deaths and 1100 MtCO2 cumulative emissions compared
to a case in which its nuclear output remained steady at the 2017 value
until 2035 (Fig. 5; see Fig. S6 for alternative cases). Careful (re)con-
sideration of this near-term trajectory would thus seem warranted,
especially in light of Germany's mitigation goals and the forecasted
NDC overshoot discussed in the previous section and shown in Fig. 4.
This analysis of avoidable impacts has important implications for
other major nuclear power producers. For example, there are credible
assessments suggesting that nuclear could decline significantly in the
US as well as the rest of Europe in the next few decades (Kunsch and
Friesewinkel, 2014; Morgan et al., 2018). If we suppose that these re-
gions adopt Germany's goal of total nuclear phaseout (whether in-
tentionally or due to unfavorable market conditions or other factors) in
a linear fashion between 2018 and 2035, we find that they could each
lose the chance to prevent over 100,000 (UR: 50,000–130,000) air
pollution-induced deaths and 6800–7400 MtCO2 cumulative emissions
from coal burning (Fig. 5). These avoidable trajectories would surely
complicate these regions' stated climate change mitigation goals
(UNFCCC, 2018), in addition to worsening outdoor air pollution-related
mortality and serious illnesses, which are already substantial in both
regions and projected to increase further if current energy policies
continue (Lelieveld et al., 2015).
4. Conclusions and policy implications
Although CO2 emissions increased in Japan and Germany in the first
three years after Fukushima, both countries have managed to reduce
their emissions thereafter despite large reductions of nuclear energy,
which until recently was a major source of non-fossil baseload power in
both countries. However both countries have experienced small but
persistent emissions increases in the last year or two. Thus it remains to
be seen what paths their near-future emissions will take, especially
given record-high levels of electricity from variable renewables, which
often rely on fossil fuels for backup (given the current lack of utility-
scale energy storage).
Moreover, by sharply reducing nuclear instead of coal and gas after
Fig. 5. Avoidable impacts caused by re-
ducing nuclear instead of fossil fuels in
four major energy using regions. Values
are cumulative preventable a) mortality
from outdoor air pollution caused by fossil
fuel use and b) fossil fuel CO2 emissions
over various time periods. Error bars denote
uncertainty ranges (see Section 2.3). For
Japan these results represent the sum of
impacts from the real-world substitution of
nuclear by fossil fuels after Fukushima
(mostly gas and coal) plus impacts from our
hypothetical “what if” scenario. Values for
Germany reflect sums over two time per-
iods: post-Fukushima (2011–2017) and 2018–2035. Values for the US and the rest of Europe (excluding Former Soviet Union) reflect sums over 2018–2035 and are
particularly high because they are the world's largest nuclear power producers.
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Fukushima, both countries lost the chance to prevent very large
amounts of air pollution-induced deaths and CO2 emissions, which will
further complicate their national climate change and air pollution mi-
tigation efforts. However there are some encouraging developments: in
Japan nuclear electricity production is increasing, and there are plans
to increase its share of total electricity to pre-Fukushima levels (∼20%)
and to increase renewables to similar levels while reducing fossil fuels.
Germany also has ambitious plans to decarbonize its electricity sector,
and as our analysis shows, reducing coal instead of (or at least prior to)
phasing out remaining nuclear would greatly enhance such efforts.
Our analysis has similar implications for other major nuclear and
fossil energy users such as the US and the rest of Europe: it would be far
more beneficial for the health of their populations and their mitigation
efforts if they curtailed electricity production from coal and gas before
or instead of phasing out nuclear.
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Total Primary Energy 
 
Total primary energy use (TPE) in Japan has shown a long-term gradual decline of about 15% since 
2000 and amounted to 19 EJ in 2017 (Figure S1a,b), which is 3.4% of the world total (BP, 2018). This 
overall decline continued after Fukushima, though the proportion of TPE from fossil fuels increased 
from 81% in 2010 to 90% in 2017 while the proportion from nuclear decreased dramatically from 15% 
to 1% (reaching zero in 2014). The renewable share of TPE increased modestly after Fukushima 
(Figure S1b).  
 
In Germany, TPE since 2000 has shown either a slight long-term decline or has remained near-steady, 
depending on the data source (Figure S1c,d). This discrepancy is likely due simply to the different 
energy accounting methods used to calculate TPE, as discussed in Section 2.1.  The IEA (2018) and BP 
(2018) datasets indicate a current TPE value of 13-14 EJ/yr (2.5% of the world total). Both datasets 
show a continuous albeit small rise in TPE (+2-6%) since 2014, which we attribute primarily to 
increasing use of gas, solar, and wind, and secondarily to increasing oil use (Figure S1c). The overall 
energy mix in Germany remains dominated by fossil fuels, which account for 80% of current TPE 
(Figure S1d). However wind and solar energy have more than doubled over the last decade, thereby 
increasing the proportion of total renewable energy considerably, from 3% in 2000 to 15% in 2017. 
After Fukushima the nuclear share of TPE almost halved, from just under 10% in 2010 to just over 5% 
in 2017.   
 
Cumulative post-Fukushima shares of TPE for both countries are shown in Figure S2. Note that fossil 
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Figure S1. Primary energy use by source (left) and total primary energy and aggregate source fractions 
(right) for Japan (top) and Germany (bottom), 2000-2017. Data are from IEA (2018) and BP (2018). Dashed 
vertical lines labeled “Fukushima” represent the timing of the accident. All annual values are taken to be end-
year values, hence we consider 2011 the first year after the accident. FF = fossil fuels, geo/bio = geothermal + 
bioenergy, renw = all renewables (hydro + non-hydro). The discrepancies between the IEA and BP curves in the 
left side graphs exist mainly because of the differences between the energy accounting methods used (see 
Section 2.1).  
 
 
 Carbon intensities and power sector CO2 emissions 
 
As shown in Figure 3a of the main text, Japan's electricity sector emissions were about 25% higher in 
2013 compared to 2010 but fell thereafter, reaching 570 MtCO2 in 2017, which remains slightly higher 
than the pre-Fukushima (2010) level. The proportion of total national emissions from electricity use has 
shown a gradual increase from 40% in 2000 to 50% in 2017 (Figure S4), which is likely due to the 
reduction in national oil use in other sectors. In Germany, the proportion of total national emissions 
from electricity production has remained essentially steady at ~40% since 2000.
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Figure S2. Cumulative post-Fukushima primary energy use (top row) and electricity generation (bottom 
row) by source, for Japan (left) and Germany (right). Renewables have reached record high levels in both 
countries, driven mainly by non-hydro sources, i.e. wind, solar, and bioenergy (Figure 1 of main text). Data are 
from BP (2018) only, as they provide an additional year over IEA (2018) data. 
 
As a result of the changes in TPE and total emissions in Japan, carbon intensity of TPE (CI_energy, 
defined as the ratio of annual CO2 emissions to TPE) increased significantly in Japan in the first three 
years after Fukushima – by 14-17% in 2013 vs. 2010 depending on the data source – then declined 
slightly (BP curve in Figure 2a inset) or remained steady (IEA inset curve). Carbon intensity of 
electricity (CI_elec) likewise increased significantly (>30%) between 2010 and 2013 but then 
decreased slightly thereafter (Figure 3a inset). Current values of both CI_energy and CI_elec remain 
substantially higher than the pre-Fukushima 2010 value. Carbon intensity of GDP (CI_gdp; Figure S3) 
rose slightly in 2011 and 2012 but then resumed its long-term decline (due to Japan's continually 
increasing GDP), reaching a value of 186 MtCO2/TnUS$ in 2017.   
 
Depending on the dataset, CI_energy in Germany either marginally decreased (BP) or increased (IEA) 
in the first three years after Fukushima, then decreased (Figure 2b inset). CI_elec shows a more 
consistent pattern across both datasets – it increased marginally between 2010 and 2013 but then 
decreased slightly thereafter (Figure 3b inset). Current values of CI_energy and CI_elec remain lower 
than the pre-Fukushima level except for IEA-based CI_energy, which is roughly equal to its 2010 value  
(Figure 2b inset). CI_gdp continued its long-term decline (due again to continually increasing GDP), 
coincidentally reaching nearly the same value as Japan in 2017 (185 MtCO2/TnUS$; Figure S3).  
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Figure S3. Carbon intensity of GDP (CI_gdp) for Japan and Germany, derived by dividing TPE CO2 
emissions by annual GDP. GDP data are from World Bank (2018) and are shown as blue curves corresponding 
to the left-side axis, while CI_gdp values are shown as red curves corresponding to the right-side axis. In both 
countries there was a relatively small post-Fukushima increase until 2013 that has since diminished. Thus, both 
countries have effectively decoupled economic growth and CO2 emissions, which is widely viewed as a 
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Figure S4. Percentage of TPE fossil fuel (FF) CO2 emissions from the electricity sector for Japan (Jpn; red 
curves) and Germany (Ger; blue curves). BP or IEA = computed electricity sector emissions based on the BP 
or IEA datasets. Values for Japan were already gradually increasing before Fukushima (due to the long-term 
decline in TPE oil emissions shown in Figure 2 of main text) and increased more rapidly in the initial few years 
afterward due to a proportionately greater increase in electricity-sector versus TPE emissions (Figure 3). Values 
for Germany have remained more or less steady in the long-term because TPE and electricity-sector emissions 
show similar relative changes.  
 


























Figure S5. Annual electricity imports and exports for Germany, 2000-2017. Data are from IEA (2018). 
Germany has been a net electricity exporter since 2003 and its net exports have steadily increased since 




























Figure S6. Nuclear power generation in Germany under alternative pathways for calculating avoidable 
impacts (see Methods Section 2.2 of main text). Trend1 is used because a pre-Fukushima decline already 
occurred between 2006-2010 (though it was not as sharp and sustained as the post-Fukushima decline between 
2011-2017). Phaseout 2022 represents current German government plans to eliminate nuclear power by 2022.  
 
 
Alternative methods for calculating Germany's avoidable impacts under nuclear phaseout 
 
In addition to the results for avoidable impacts presented for Germany in Section 3.3 in the main text, 
we examine the cases shown in Figure S6 in order to conduct a simple bounding analysis. For reasons 
discussed in Methods Section 2.2 of the main text, we assume a projection period from 2018-2035 here 
as well.  
 
For our first alternative case (case 1), we assume nuclear power output had remained fixed at its 2010 
level until 2035 (as in Eq. 2). Then we subtract the projected annual values from 2018-2022 and a 
value of zero from 2022-2035 – i.e., the dashed blue curve in Figure S6 labeled “phaseout 2022”. The 
annual electricity difference term in Eq. 2 in this case becomes E(n, 2010) - E(n, phaseout2022(t)), for t 
from 2018-2035. This case can be regarded as an upper bound for our projection period because it uses 
the pre-Fukushima nuclear output level as its baseline. It yields cumulative values of 33,000 (UR: 
16,500-43,000) preventable deaths and 2200 MtCO2 preventable emissions between 2018-2035.  
 
 We examine one additional illustrative case (case 2) for the projection period in which we use the 
values shown in in trend1 in Figure S6 as the baseline time series in Eq. 2. This approach is taken 
because there was a generally declining trend in nuclear output in Germany even before Fukushima, 
albeit less steep and over a shorter period. We then follow a similar procedure as in case 1, i.e. again 
subtract projected values from the “phaseout 2022” curve in Figure S6. This case can therefore be 
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thought of as a lower bound for our projection period because it illustrates the implications of a more 
gradual phaseout of nuclear in Germany than currently being implemented. The annual electricity 
difference term in Eq. 2 in this case becomes E(n, trend1(t)) - E(n, phaseout2022(t)), for t from 2018-
2035. This case yields cumulative values of 7400 (UR: 3700-9600) preventable deaths and 490 MtCO2 
preventable emissions between 2018-2035.  
 
For comparison, the case discussed in the main text yields cumulative values of 16,000 (UR: 8000-
21,000) preventable deaths and 1100 MtCO2 preventable emissions between 2018-2035 – thus it falls 
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